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Big  Ne w s  Fro m t h e  Co mmis s io n , a n d  t h e  Led g e  Is  on  t h e  Lo o s e :
Rec e n t  De v e l o pmen t s  in  Na t u r a l  Res o u r c es  La w
Th o mas  A. Da il y 1
In c r e a s e d  De n s it y  f or  t h e  Mid d l e  At o k a—Can  Yo u  Say  "Unit  Su b d iv is io n s "?
For years we have observed that, contrary to our prior primitive understanding of 
geology, there are places in the Arkoma Basin where a single well will not effectively 
and efficiently drain a 640 acre drilling unit. That is particularly the case in fields along 
the south flank of the basin.2 Wells drilled in those units produce from Middle Atoka 
sands, which are both structurally and stratigraphically disconnected.
Units in those fields already contain numerous wells which are permitted to 
produce from the same correlative formations. Their operators have shown them to be 
physically separated from one another. Still, it is unreasonable to require an operator to 
drill and complete a well before learning whether he can produce its gas.
For years the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission has moved haltingly toward a 
solution. This time last year it seemed that the answer lay in a stripper well rule. That 
proposal was to exempt stripper wells3 from the so-called "rule of one."4
There was much to like about the proposed stripper well rule. It promised to 
permit additional development of important Middle Atoka reserves while allowing
1Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas.
2e.g., Mansfield, Gragg, Booneville, Chismville and Waveland Fields.
3Wells incapable of producing 60 MCF per day.
4Only one well may produce at any one time from each common source of 
supply within the unit.
complete economic depletion of marginal wells. Unfortunately, the devil was in the 
details. The gas industry and the Commission failed to reach a consensus over such 
issues as whether the stripper provision should be applied to each separate completion 
within a well or whether those completions had to meet the stripper test when added 
together. Ultimately the Commission tabled the stripper proposal while inviting 
operators to apply for relief on a case-by-case basis.
In the meantime the Commission has favored another approach to the 
problem— unit subdivisions. Field rules for portions of Mansfield, Booneville, Chismville 
and Gragg Fields have been amended to permit multiple unit wells to be produced from 
a common reservoir as long as they are located in separate 160 acre unit subdivisions. 
Thus, a separate well can tap a common source from each 160 acre quarter section 
within a 640 acre unit. Importantly, royalty payment and equitable ownership of the 
wells continue to be on a 640 acre basis.5
In late January, 2003, SEECO, Inc. filed an application for 80 acre unit 
subdivisions in Waveland Field. Waveland reservoir permeability is even worse than 
the rest of Middle Atoka. That application will be heard the day before this paper is 
presented.
Beelzebub still haunts the details. The Commission's unit subdivision orders are 
not identical. Industry has yet to reach consensus on minimum spacing between wells. 
Ultimately these inconsistencies will be resolved, but we are not there yet.
5Unfortunately, working interest owners can alter homogenous working interest 
ownership by going no consent or dealing in bore hole farmouts.
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The Arkansas General Assembly meets biannually in odd-numbered years. 
2003 is such a year. The Legislature is in Little Rock as we speak.
It is a typical legislative session. Bills have been filed which would increase 
severance taxes,6 regulate gas well compressors7 and effectively banish standard form 
contracts.8 As of February 13, 2003, at least eight bills of interest to the natural 
resources industry are pending. A summary of the status of those bills, downloaded 
from the Legislature's website9 follows:
House Bill 1078 
Sponsor: Verkamp
TO AUTHORIZE THE OIL AND GAS COMMISSION TO ADOPT 
NOISE STANDARDS, SOUND LEVEL LIMITS, AND NOISE CONTROL 
RULES FOR NOISE RESULTING FROM THE OPERATION AND 
MAINTENANCE OF NATURAL GAS WELLS, PIPELINE COMPRESSORS.
1/15/2003 - 1/15/2003 2:06:50 PM - Read the first time, rules sus-
pended, read the second time and referred to the Committee on 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT- HOUSE
House Bill 1319 
Sponsor: Lendall
TO REVISE THE RATES FOR SEVERANCE TAX ON 
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1/31/2003 - 1/31/2003 12:23:30 PM - Read the first time, rules 
suspended, read the second time and referred to the Committee on 
REVENUE & TAXATION- HOUSE
Senate Bill 45 
Sponsor: B. Johnson
TO RESTRUCTURE VARIOUS STATE AGENCIES 
INTO TEN (10) DEPARTMENTS.
2/12/2003 - 2/12/2003 3:09:51 PM - Read the first time, rules 
suspended, read the second time and referred to the Committee on 
STATE AGENCIES & GOVT’L AFFAIRS- HOUSE 
2/11/2003 - 2/11/2003 4:22:42 PM - RECEIVED FROM THE SENATE 
2/11/2003 - 2/11/2003 3:56:35 PM - Ordered immediately transmitted to 
the House.
2/11/2003- 2/11/2003 3:56:28 PM - CLINCHER MOTION ADOPTED 
2/11/2003- 2/11/2003 3:55:02 PM - EMERGENCY CLAUSE ADOPTED 
2/11/2003 - 2/11/2003 3:54:19 PM - The vote by which the Emergency 
Clause failed was expunged
2/11/2003- 2/11/2003 3:53:30 PM - The Clincher was Expunged 
2/11/2003 - 2/11/2003 3:50:27 PM - CLINCHER MOTION ADOPTED 
2/11/2003 - 2/11/2003 3:49:02 PM - Emergency Clause failed of adoption. 
2/11/2003 - 2/11/2003 3:48:07 PM - Read the third time and passed. 
2/6/2003 - 2/6/2003 11:44:40 AM - Returned by the Committee, with the 
recommendation that it Do Pass
2/5/2003 - 2/5/2003 1:40:49 PM - Re-referred to Senate Committee on 
State Agencies and Governmental Affairs
2/5/2003 - 2/5/2003 1:40:41 PM - REPORTED CORRECTLY ENGROSSED 
2/5/2003 - 2/5/2003 12:53:45 PM - Amendment # 3 read the first time, 
rules suspended, read the second time and adopted, ordered engrossed. 
2/5/2003 - 2/5/2003 12:53:31 PM - Placed on second reading for 
purpose of amendment.
2/5/2003 - 2/5/2003 12:50:00 AM - Withdrawn from Committee for 
purpose of amendment # 3
2/3/2003 - 2/3/2003 3:23:35 PM - Re-referred to Senate Committee on 
State Agencies and Governmental Affairs
2/3/2003 - 2/3/2003 3:23:22 PM - REPORTED CORRECTLY ENGROSSED 
2/3/2003 - 2/3/2003 1:44:10 PM - Amendment #1 withdrawn 
2/3/2003 - 2/3/2003 1:44:09 PM - Amendment # 2 read the first time, 
rules suspended, read the second time and adopted, ordered engrossed. 
2/3/2003 - 2/3/2003 1:43:59 PM - Placed on second reading for purpose 
of amendment.
2/3/2003 - 2/3/2003 1:40:42 PM - Withdrawn from Committee for
4
purpose of amendment # 2
1/15/2003 - 1/15/2003 4:26:15 PM - Read first time, rules suspended, 
read second time, referred to Senate Committee on State Agencies and 
Governmental Affairs
House Bill 1281 
Sponsor: Ledbetter
THE "FAIR BARGAIN ACT OF 2003"
1/29/2003 - 1/29/2003 3:05:08 PM - Read the first time, rules sus-
pended, read the second time and referred to the Committee on 
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE- HOUSE
House Bill 1076 
Sponsor: Verkamp
AN ACT TO AMEND ARKANSAS CODE § 18-28-403 
TO REDUCE THE TIME REQUIRED FOR UNCLAIMED 
MINERAL PROCEEDS TO BE PRESUMED ABANDONED.
2/12/2003 - 2/12/2003 1:21:09 PM - Returned by the Committee Do Pass 
1/15/2003 - 1/15/2003 2:05:59 PM - Read the first time, rules 
suspended, read the second time and referred to the Committee on 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT- HOUSE
Senate Bill 75 
Sponsor: G. Jeffress
AN ACT TO ALLOW THE SURFACE OWNER OF PROPERTY TO PURCHASE 
THE TAX DELINQUENT SEVERED MINERAL RIGHTS TO THEIR PROPERTY.
1/22/2003 - 1/22/2003 2:28:37 PM - Read first time, rules suspended, 
read second time, referred to Senate Committee on Revenue and 
Taxation
House Bill 1383 
Sponsor: Gillespie
AN ACT TO RAISE THE THRESHOLD FOR ANNUAL AGGREGATE PAYMENTS
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FOR OIL AND GAS PROCEEDS TO ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($100).
2/11/2003 - 2/11/2003 4:23:47 PM - Read first time, rules suspended, 
read second time, referred to Senate Committee on Agriculture, Forestry 
and Economic Development
2/11/2003 - 2/11/2003 4:23:40 PM - Received from the House.
2/10/2003 - 2/10/2003 1:09:46 PM - Read the third time and passed and 
ordered transmitted to the Senate.
2/7/2003 - 2/7/2003 9:43:40 AM - RETURNED BY THE COMMITTEE 
WITH THE RECOMMENDATION DO PASS, NON-CONTROVERSIAL.
2/5/2003 - 2/5/2003 2:52:30 PM - Read the first time, rules suspended, 
read the second time and referred to the Committee on AGRICULTURE, 
FORESTRY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT- HOUSE
Senate Bill 154 
Sponsor: Wilkinson
TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC STIMULUS TO THE COAL MINING 
INDUSTRY BY PROVIDING A TAX CREDIT TO MINING 
ENTERPRISES THAT MINE ARKANSAS COAL.
1/29/2003 - 1/29/2003 2:17:45 PM - Read first time, rules suspended, 
read second time, referred to Senate Committee on Revenue and 
Taxation
It is probable that additional developments will occur during the week between 
February 13 and the presentation of this paper. This portion of the paper will be 
updated to reflect those developments.
Ok l a h o ma  Co n t o r t io n is t  Cas e  Reac h es  Co u r t  o f  Appea ls
At the 2002 Natural Resources Law Institute we began our discussion of Kaiser- 
Frances Oil Company v. Bridenstine.10 The facts are set out in some detail in the 2002
10 Texas County, Oklahoma, District Court Case No. CJ-2000-1.
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Natural Resources Law Institute proceedings.11 Here is the capsule summary. A 
company named Funk owned the leases, the wells and the gathering system. Funk's 
gathering system charged Funk's wells 450 per MCF for gathering as well as a 
“marketing fee.” Funk went broke. Funk filed bankruptcy. Kaiser-Frances Oil 
Company bought Funk out of the bankruptcy.
The class of royalty owners sued Kaiser-Frances and others claiming it had been 
defrauded. The essence of the fraud was that Kaiser-Frances' predecessor12 deducted 
illegally from the royalty and then failed to so inform the lessors. After all of the other 
defendants settled with the class, the jury awarded the class almost $55 million actual 
damages and almost $19 million punitive damages against Kaiser-Frances.13
The case is now in the Oklahoma Court of Appeals. Kaiser-Frances' brief cites 
numerous asserted errors committed by the trial court. Two of those are obviously the 
most important.
The first asserted error involves a jury instruction.14 Instruction 26 told the jury
that:
(1) No costs incurred to create a marketable product can be deducted from the 
royalty share.
(2) Actual post-production enhancement costs (i.e. costs incurred after a
11 41st Natural Resources Law Institute (2002), pp. 1 through 4.
12 Funk
13 Kaiser-Frances was entitled to a credit of about $14 million attributable to the 
amounts paid to the class by the settling defendants.
14Jury Instruction 26.
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marketable product has been obtained), which are incurred off the lease or unit, may be 
deducted from royalty only if the working interest owner proves all of the following three 
conditions:
(a) That the costs are associated with transforming an already 
marketable product into an enhanced product;
(b) That the costs deducted were reasonable; and
(c) That the actual royalty revenues increased in proportion to the costs 
assessed against the royalty owner.
(3) The working interest owner is not entitled to profit at the expense of the 
royalty owner; therefore, any permitted recovery of actual costs shall be without 
allowance of any profit to the working interest owner.
(4) To be marketable, the gas must be transported by the working interest owner 
at its sole cost to the place of sale unless the place of sale is “a distant market.” That 
is, the working interest owner must pay all costs of transporting the gas unless the 
place of sale is at a “distant market.”
The trial court based Jury Instruction 26 upon its interpretation of Mittelstaedt v. 
Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.15 Actually, as Kaiser-Frances points out in its appellate brief, a 
better statement of the Mittelstaedt doctrine is as follows:
(1) Royalty is valued at the well.
(2) When the lessee has made marketable gas available at the well and there is 
no market on the lease premises, the royalty owner must share in the reasonable cost
15 954.P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998)
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of moving the gas to market.
(3) If the gas is marketable and there is a market for gas at the well, but the 
lessee turns down the wellhead market and instead elects to construct a pipeline to 
move the gas off the lease premises, the lessor must share in the cost of transporting, 
blending, compression and dehydration off premises but only to the extent the lessee 
proves the costs are reasonable and enhance the value of the product.
The difference between Jury Instruction 26 and Kaiser-Frances' version of the 
rule of Mittelstaedt is obvious. Under Kaiser-Frances' interpretation, if, as it contends, 
there was no market at the well, Funk was entitled to charge royalty owners something 
for transporting the gas. Even if the 45¢ per MCF which Funk charged was excessive, 
the judgment should not have been for the entire amount but only for the excessive 
portion of the charges.
Second, Kaiser-Frances argues that, under Oklahoma law, it should not be held 
liable for punitive damages when the offense was committed by a corporate entity 
which it later acquired. If the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter, that 
makes sense.
Interestingly, the appeal contains no challenge of the contortionism that occurred 
in the case. In Texas, at least, no breach of contract can also be a tort.16 In that state, 
fraud may be relevant in contract cases, because fraudulent concealment of the cause 
of action can toll the Statute of Limitations. However, if the case sounds in contract,
16 See. DeWitt County Electric Coop. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 1999); 
Southwestern Bell v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991); Southwestern Bell v. 
Delanney, 809 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1991); Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 
S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
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rather than tort, punitive damages cannot be recovered.
This is a case to keep our eye on. Perhaps it will be resolved by this time next
year.
A r k an s as  Co u r t  o f  Appea ls  A f f ir ms  In j u n c t io n  
Ag a in s t  Use  of  W el l  Road  Und er  “Ac c o mmo d a t io n  Do c t r in e ”
McFarland and Pittman own oil and gas leases on land owned by Taylor. The 
leases are at least 20 years old. A successful well was drilled on lands west of Taylor's 
property in the mid 1980's. For many years, the operators of that well used a road 
across Taylor's property, apparently with Taylor's permission. McFarland and Pittman 
acquired the oil and gas leases by assignment in 1998. In 1997 or 1998, Taylor's son, 
daughter-in-law and their small daughter moved into a mobile home adjacent to the 
road. The Taylors sought an injunction against further use of the road by McFarland 
and Pittman because of annoying traffic to and from the well and potential danger to 
their granddaughter. They offered evidence that an alternate road could be utilized at a 
cost of “no more than $1,500.00."
The trial court17 granted the injunction and the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
affirmed.18 Citing the Arkansas Supreme Court's 1929 opinion in Martin v. Da/e,19 the 
Court of Appeals held that, while an oil and gas lessee has a reasonable right of 
ingress and egress, he must use it in the manner “least injurious” to the surface owner.
17 The Honorable Larry Chandler
18 McFarland and Pittman v. Taylor, 76 Ark. App. 343, 65 S.W.3d 468 (1992).
19 180 Ark. 321, 21 S.W.2d 428.
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Moreover, the Court stated that “what is reasonable is a question of fact.” Thus, the 
standard of review is whether the lower court's determination of reasonableness was 
clearly erroneous. The court held that the lower court's injunction requiring the use of 
the alternate road, even at an additional cost, was not clearly erroneous and thus 
should be affirmed.
A r k a n s a s  Co u r t  of  Appea ls  Ho l ds  t h a t  1938 Min e r a l  
Re s e r v a t io n  Did  No t  In c l u d e  Brin e  Und er  S t r o h ac k e r  Do c t r in e
In 1938, appellant's predecessors conveyed the Union County lands in question 
to Lyon Oil Refining Company by quitclaim deed. The quitclaim deed excepted all oil, 
gas and minerals. Appellants contended that that exception included timber rights and 
bromine enriched brine. The Court of Appeals did not agree.20 It affirmed that timber 
is not a mineral, relying upon Bonds v. Carter21 and Arnold v. Grigsby22 It then held 
that brine is a mineral.23 However, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling that brine 
was not generally regarded to be a mineral in 1938 when the quitclaim deed was 
executed and that, therefore, under the rule in Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Strohacker24 
the reservation in the quitclaim deed in question was ineffective as a reservation of
20D.M. Riche, Inc. v. McGowen Working Partners, Inc., No. CA02-27 (Ark.App. 
11/13/2002)
21 348 Ark. 591, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002).
22 158 Ark. 232, 249 S.W. 548 (1923)
23 Relying upon A.C.A. § 15-56-301 (b).
24 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941)
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brine. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals opinion in Riche is an unpublished opinion.
It is available for download from the Arkansas Court of Appeals website. A link to the 
website is one of the “law links” available on the Arkansas Bar Association's home 
page.25 Members of the Arkansas Bar Association can also access unpublished 
Arkansas Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Opinions through Arkansas VersusLaw, 
beginning approximately March 1 , 2003.
Tex as  Co u r t  of  Appea ls  Re j ec t s  Bro ad  In t e r p r e t a t io n  
o f  t h e  “Mo t h e r  Hu bbar d  Cl au s e ”
Mary Greer owned the surface, a one-fourth interest in the minerals, an 
additional one-fourth royalty interest and all executory rights in a 20-acre tract in 
Wharton County, Texas. She also owned a one-fourth non-participating royalty interest 
in three other 20-acre tracts. Two of those tracts were pooled into a unit named the 
“AB 801 SEC 14/W M Bernard #14 Survey,” also known as the Medallion Oil-Sixs Frels 
Unit.
Ms. Greer then executed a royalty deed covering “all of that land out of the AB 
801 SEC 14/W M Bernard #14 Survey, Wharton County, Texas, known as the 
Medallion Oil-Sixs Frels Unit.” The royalty deed contained the following language “in 
addition to the above-described lands, it is the intent of this instrument to convey, and 
this conveyance does so include, all of Grantor's royalty and overriding royalty interest 
in all oil, gas and other minerals in the above-named county or counties, whether 
actually or properly described herein or not, and all of said lands are covered and
25 www.arkbar.com
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included herein as fully, and in all respects, as if the same had been actually and 
properly described herein.”
Moore was the assignee of the Grantee in the royalty deed. Moore contended 
that the above-quoted “Mother Hubbard Clause” made him the owner of Greer's right to 
receive royalty in her other tracts which were not in the Medallion Oil-Sixs Frels Unit. 
The Texas Court of Appeals disagreed. In Greer v. Moore26 the Court held that such 
Mother Hubbard language conveys only small pieces or strips which may exist without 
the knowledge of one or both of the parties or which should have been described in the 
granting clause but were not described due to an incorrect legal description.
Sa me  W es t  V ir g in ia  Dec is io n  Dis a l l o w s  Ro y a l t y  
Ded u c t io n  for  Po s t  Pr o d u c t io n  Co st s  an d  
Vo id s  “Ju d ic ia l  As c e r t a in me n t  Cl au s es ”
Welleman v. Energy Resources, In c27 is a classic example of the adage “bad 
facts make bad law." Energy Resources, the lessee, did everything wrong. The leases 
provided that Energy Resources would commence operations on or before January 1,
1993 or, if it did not, would pay delay rental of $1.00 per acre per year. Energy 
Resources did neither of those things. Therefore, its leases expired on January 1,
1993.
Apparently oblivious to that reality, Energy Resources re-established production 
from an old gas well on the premises in October 1993 and produced that well until 
November 1998. Energy Resources received $2.22 per MCF for gas sold from the well.
26 72 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. App. Dist. 1 2002)
27 210 W.Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001).
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Royalties, on the other hand, were paid at a rate of 1/8th of 870 per MCF.
According to Energy Resources, the difference between $2.22 and 870 was
“post-production costs.” In other words, because of the deduction for post-production
costs, royalty owners were being paid royalty on less than 30% of the gross proceeds of
the gas all pursuant to an expired lease. Energy Resources was pocketing the
difference.28 In their lawsuit, the Wellemans sought cancellation of the leases or,
alternatively, a judicial determination that the leases had expired. The Wellemans also
sought the disallowance of the post-production charges. Energy Resources raised the
leases' “judicial ascertainment clauses” as a defense. Each of those clauses reads:
This lease shall never be forfeited or terminated for failure of lessee to 
perform in whole or in part any of its express or implied covenants, 
conditions or obligations until it shall have been first finally judicially 
determined that such failure exists, and lessee shall have been given a 
reasonable time after such final determination within which to comply with 
any such covenants, conditions or obligations.
The Welleman court found two perfectly good reasons to declare the judicial 
ascertainment clauses void. First, the court held that such clauses are violative of 
public policy since they deprive the lessor of fundamental remedies and thus could 
enable the lessee to coerce acquiescence in unconscionable lessee behavior. Second, 
the clauses promote judicial waste29 since they require every dispute where the lessor is 
successful to be litigated twice, first to accomplish the judicial ascertainment and then 
to terminate the lease.
28 At this point, it should be observed that had this writer represented the 
Wellemans, he would have contended that they were entitled to 8/8ths of $2.20 per 
MCF without deduction for costs of any kind because of Energy Resources' bad faith 
trespass.
29 Judicial economy being the desired objective.
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The Welleman court then went on to absolutely forbid the deduction of any kind 
of post-production cost from the royalty share. The court's scholarship on this issue is a 
little shaky. For example, in concluding that its result is likewise the law in Oklahoma, it 
cites Wood v. TXO Production Corp,30 but fails to cite Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, 
Inc.,31 a case which substantially clarifies and somewhat modifies Wood. Also cited is 
the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Hanna Oil and Gas Co. v. Taylor32 As has 
often been observed, the true rule of Hanna v. Taylor may be that once a lessee has 
established a course of interpretation of its lease, it may not unilaterally change that 
interpretation. Even if Hanna v. Taylor really is about deductibility of post-production 
costs, it was decided well before Mittelstaedt and the Arkansas court may well re- 
examine it in the light of Mittelstaedt.
Gas  Ow n e r s  Open  Su bs t a n t ia l  Lead  
in Ba t t l e  w it h  Coal  Ow n e r  o ve r  Co al  Bed  Me t h an e
A hot current issue is whether coal bed methane is owned by the gas owner or 
the coal owner when those two owners are not one and the same. The coal owner has 
won the first two heats, Pennsylvania33 and Alabama.34
The coal owner's early lead was not to last. The gas owner has won the last
30 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992)
31 Supra.
32 297 Ark. 80, 579 S.W.2d 563 (1988).
33 United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (P.A. 1983)
34 NCNB Texas National Bank v. West, 631 So.2d 212 (Ala 1993).
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battles. Coal bed methane gas is gas in Montana,35 Federal and Indian Lands36 and, 
very recently, Wyoming. The Wyoming case is Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land 
Company37
Neither Arkansas nor Oklahoma has a reported decision on this issue although 
both states are seeing coal bed methane development in areas where both coal and 
gas are severed. The only Oklahoma case was decided in the District Court of Haskell 
County and never appealed.38 In that case, the district judge's well-reasoned opinion 
was that coal bed methane belongs to the gas owner.
Arkansas has absolutely no case law on this issue. However, there is a pending 
interpleader case39 which may result in a decision, if it is not settled.
35 Parvin County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc., 271 Mont. 459, 898 P.2d 680 
(1995).
36 Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 465, 119 S. Ct. 
1719, 144 L.Ed.2d 22 (1999)
372002 Wy. 132,_____ P.3d._____ (2002)
38 Roberts v. Ambassador Oil Corp., Haskell County District Court Case No. 
C-94-43.
39 CDX Gas, LLC v. Upland Industries, et a/., Sebastian County Circuit Case No. 
CIV-2001-144 G (I).
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